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Abstract
This paper investigates the use of fuzzy inference for detection of abnormal changes in email traffic
communication behaviour. Several communication behaviour measures and metrics are defined for extracting
information on the traffic communication behaviour of email users. The information from these behaviour
measures is then combined using a hierarchy of fuzzy inference systems, to provide an abnormality rating for
overall changes in communication behaviour of suspect email accounts. The use of fuzzy inference is then
demonstrated with a case study investigating the email traffic behaviour of a person’s email accounts from the
Enron email corpus.
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INTRODUCTION
On 10th August 2006, 21 terror suspects were arrested in Britain on suspicion of plotting to blow up United States
bound commercial airflights with liquid explosives (Natta et al., 2006). It was reported that British security
services, MI5, had been monitoring these suspects for up to at least 12 months prior to making the arrests in
August 2006. The New York Times (Natta et al., 2006) reported that MI5 had used several sources of
information to monitor the activities of the British terror suspects. These methods included: bugging their
apartments, tapping their phones, monitoring their bank transactions, and eavesdropping on their Internet traffic
and email messages.
This British terror case highlights the importance of monitoring the activities of terror suspects. Monitoring
helps law enforcement investigators keep track of what terror suspects are doing, as well as who they are
communicating with, and whether suspects are doing anything that indicates an unusual change in their pattern
of behaviour compared to their normal activities (e.g. informing terror cell members when to conduct the attack).
If the British security services had not been keeping watch on the activities of the British terror suspects and
made the arrests based on what they had observed, the world might have experienced another airlinerelated
tragic event, similar to the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 (Whitney and Strasser,
2004).
Another point to note from the New York Times article is how the use of multiple sources of information by
British Security Services may have helped to provide a broader perspective on what the terror suspects were
doing. Multiple sources of information such as phone tapping, monitoring of bank transactions, and
eavesdropping on Internet traffic and email messages, provided the British security services with a variety of
sources for detecting any unusual patterns of behaviour or change from normal habits (e.g. an unusually large
bank withdrawal). One of the difficulties in dealing with multiple sources of information is how to combine or
“fuse” the information together. Some of the information sources may show evidence that unusual activity is

occurring, but sometimes it may not be clear to the investigator how to combine the information together.
Another problem is that it may be difficult for the investigator to know which monitored suspect should be
observed more closely either as a matter of priority or based on the available evidence.
Our research work is on the analysis of email traffic communications, with a focus on determining how artificial
intelligence techniques could be useful in aiding the user/intelligence analyst to investigate a suspected
individual’s email traffic communication behaviour. In our previous work (Lim et al., 2005, Lim et al., 2006) an
email traffic analyser system was developed as a conceptual system to investigate the use of data visualisation
techniques and decision trees (Witten and Frank, 2005, Negnevitsky, 2004) for finding “unusual”
communication behaviour from simulated email traffic data. Our recent work focuses on developing a new
anomaly detection module for the email traffic analyser system, which analyses a list of suspects for deviations
from their normal patterns of communication behaviour in email traffic and alerts the user when an abnormal
change in communication behaviour has occurred. The recent work also looks at what the email traffic analyser
system can reveal from genuine email traffic data. A diagram of the email traffic analyser system is shown in
Figure 1.

Figure 1: The email traffic analyser system.
In this paper, a brief description is first provided on anomaly detection and how the method of anomaly detection
is being used to detect changes in email traffic communication behaviour. The second part of the paper
describes defining email traffic communication behaviour measures and how these will be used to record
behavioural information on the email user being analysed. The third part of the paper describes how the

anomaly detection module will profile the behaviour of email users and detect changes in communication
behaviour patterns. The fourth section describes how fuzzy inference is being used to combine information from
different communication behaviour measures. This is then followed by a case study of the Enron email corpus,
comparing the alert results produced by individual communication behaviour measures and the results produced
after fusing the information together using fuzzy inference.

ANOMALY DETECTION
The main aim of our current work is to monitor the email traffic of a suspected individual for any significant
deviations from their normal communication behaviour patterns. The purpose of this is to bring to the attention
of the user/analyst that an abnormal or unusual event is occurring and assist them in finding the location of the
unusual event in the data. Our aim is to just inform the user about the presence of an unusual change in
communication behaviour for the monitored suspect and allow the user to utilise data visualisation tools (Lim et
al., 2005, Lim et al., 2006) or other analysis tools to investigate the details of that unusual event. We leave it up
to the user to decide the context or meaning of the unusual event (e.g. is it a planned terrorist attack or a planned
birthday party?), rather than try to encode the contextual knowledge into the system.
The method being used to detect changes in email traffic communication behaviour is anomaly detection, a
method that is commonly used in intrusion detection (Bace and Mell, 2001) to detect new types of intrusion
attacks, previously unknown to a computer system or computer network. Anomaly detection is based on the idea
that the computer system or computer network has a “normal” operating state, which can be used to determine if
the system is currently under attack from an unknown intruder. In intrusion detection, the intrusion detection
system (IDS) builds a model of the target computer system’s “normal” state of behaviour and uses that model to
determine if the current state of the system is exhibiting significant deviations from the normal state of
behaviour. If there are significant deviations, then the IDS informs the system or network administrator that there
is an abnormal change in behaviour, indicating a possible attack on the computer system or computer network.
Although anomaly detection is commonly used in computer network security (Mohay, 2003), the same principles
may also be applied for electronic surveillance applications when monitoring suspected individuals for changes
in communication behaviour. In our email traffic analyser system, the anomaly detection module is used to
detect possible changes in email traffic communication behaviour for a list of suspected individuals. The email
traffic analyser system firstly requires the user to select a list of suspect email addresses from the email system
being analysed, to specify which email accounts will be monitored. The user then selects a historical period of
time or “profiling period” (e.g. a period of 1 year, starting at two years ago), which is used by the anomaly
detection module to build behaviour profiles for all suspects and record their “normal” communication
behaviour patterns. After normal behaviour profiles have been created and stored in the email traffic database
(Figure 1), the user then selects a recent period of time or “surveillance period” (e.g. a period of 6 months,
ending on last week), which is used by the anomaly detection module to determine whether the recent behaviour
of the suspects has significantly deviated from their “normal” communication behaviour.

DEFINING E-MAIL TRAFFIC COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOUR MEASURES
Before changes in communication behaviour patterns can be detected, communication behaviour measures need
to be defined in order for the anomaly detection module to determine what kind of information will be used to
record a change in communication behaviour. Thus, it is necessary to define communication behaviour
measures, in order to describe particular aspects of an individual’s email traffic communication behaviour and
to describe how that individual’s communication behaviour may have changed at different periods of time. In
this work, communication behaviour measures can be defined based on three sets of information taken from the
header segments of email messages: the sender (the “from” field), the recipient/s (the “To”, “CC”, and “BCC”
fields), and the date/time that the message was sent (from the “date” field). Using these three basic sets of
information from the header component of email messages (excluding the content of email messages), the
following types of communication behaviour measures can be defined:

•Email Traffic Volume – based on a count of the number of emails generated by an individual per
hour, per day, per week, or per month, and sent to a particular contact. This provides information on
the traffic volume flow of emails generated by an individual and the rate at which messages are
being sent to particular contacts.
•Delays Between Emails Sent (or “Sending Delays”) – based on a measure of the time delays
between each email message sent by an individual. This provides information on expected delays
between each message sent by an individual to particular contacts.
•Replying Response Time (or “Replying Delays”) – based on a measure of the time it takes for an
individual to write a response email to messages received from particular associates. This provides
information on how quickly an individual is expected to reply to particular associates.
After defining the above communication behaviour measures, a set of metrics can be computed to produce a
number that describes and summarises information about a particular communication behaviour measure. Each
metric computed will provide information about an aspect of the monitored individual’s communication
behaviour. The following set of metrics were defined to describe and summarise each of the above
communication behaviour measures, using statistical methods (Salkind, 2004, Gravetter and Wallnau, 2004,
Chatfield, 1996):
•Consistency of Weekly Email Traffic Volume – computes the autocorrelation of the weekly volume
of emails produced by an individual, to indicate how “consistent” or “reliable” an individual is with
the weekly volume of email traffic sent to particular associates. The autocorrelation, r, produces a
number between –1.0 to +1.0 to indicate the relationship between each timeseries point in the
weekly email traffic volume data. This is computed using the autocorrelation formula from
(Chatfield, 1996):
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•Percentage of Weekly Email Traffic Volume – computes the average percentage of emails sent to
particular associates each week (e.g. 10% of emails per week to contact A, 40% per week to contact
B, 50% per week to contact C).
•Median of Sending Delays – computes the most commonly occurring time delays between emails
sent to a particular associate, by using the statistical median.
•Median of Replying Delays – computes the most commonly occurring response delay between e
mails replied to a particular associate, by using the statistical median.
It should be noted that when analysing email traffic, one could also analyse the flow of email messages in
terms of the direction of the email traffic (i.e. email messages are either being sent or received by an
individual). By taking the direction of email traffic into account, the original four sets of metrics described
above can be expanded into nine metrics, which summarises and describes an individual’s incoming or outgoing
email traffic communication behaviour with each of their contacts. The diagram in Figure 2 shows the mapping
of the nine metrics in relation to the communication behaviour measures. Note that the metric titled “Median Of

Combined Replying Delays With Contacts” considers the most commonly occurring response delay for both
incoming and outgoing email traffic, hence providing information about the speed of the sendresponse
interactions between the individual and a particular associate.
These nine metrics are being used to record information about the state of the suspected individual’s traffic
communication behaviour patterns for the anomaly detection module. Note that the above is not an exhaustive
list of all possible communication behaviour measures or metrics that can be extracted from email header
information (i.e. sender, recipient, date/time information). The list defined above is the basic set of email traffic
behaviour measures that we have chosen to focus upon for this work.
Other researchers working on similar or related email surveillance applications have explored different types of
measures that can be extracted from sender, recipient, and date/time information. In the work by Stolfo et al.
(2003a, 2003b), they have taken a patternbased or habitbased approach where they consider particular habits of
email users, such as defining a measure for the time of day the user normally sends emails and a measure for
the frequency of communication with particular contacts (“recipient frequency”). Another approach considered
are ratiobased measures, where Jiang et al. (2005) defined measures such as: ratio of new addresses vs. former
addresses (measuring the rate that new email addresses appear), ratio of new senders vs. former senders
(measuring the rate that new sending addresses appear), ratio of emails sent over time (measuring the volume of
emails sent). Additional email traffic behavioural measures can be defined by using other header information
fields (Tanenbaum, 2003) such as text/HTML formatting of the email, presence of attachments, or MIME file
attachment type (Martin et al., 2005).

Figure 2: Mapping of the different patterns of behaviour that we are measuring from email message headers.

ANALYSING FOR CHANGES IN COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOUR
After the nine metrics were defined, these were used to build “normal” behaviour profiles for each of the suspect
email accounts during their profiling period. To build the normal behaviour profiles, each of the suspect’s
communication links with an associate is analysed and the nine metrics are computed for each communication
link, which are then stored as the suspect’s behaviour profile in the email traffic database. Figure 3 shows how
the nine metrics are computed for each communication link with particular associates.

Figure 3: Diagram of how nine metrics are computed for each of the suspect’s communication links.
To detect a change in communication behaviour, the nine metrics are again computed for each of the suspect’s
communication links during the surveillance period and the recent communication behaviour measurements are
compared with the measurements from the profiling period. If the recent behaviour of any communication link
shows significant deviations from their previous communication behaviour patterns, then the user is alerted to
the presence of an abnormal change in behaviour. In addition to alerting the user about changes in
communication behaviour, the anomaly detection module also informs the user if there are new associates that
have appeared in the surveillance period, which were not present in the suspect’s “normal” behaviour profiling
period.
The work by (Jiang et al., 2005, Stolfo et al., 2003a, Stolfo et al., 2003b, Martin et al., 2005) focuses on
providing information on deviations in behaviour for each of the communication behaviour measures that they
record from email users. However, the problem with their work is that they present the
user/administrator/analyst with a lot of information about each of their communication behaviour measures, but
do not summarise the email accounts that exhibit the most deviation in communication behaviour. For the user,
all of the communication behaviour measures presented may be quite useful, but on first glance there is too
much information for them to determine which email account is exhibiting the most deviation in communication
behaviour and maybe thus the most interesting. Summarising all of the suspect email accounts’ change in
behaviour is important, because if the user is trying to analyse the data for a large number of email accounts
(e.g. more than 10), which email account should they pay attention to first? Which communication links should
receive first priority in the investigation?

COMBINING INFORMATION USING FUZZY INFERENCE TECHNIQUES
To summarise the changes in communication behaviour of suspect email accounts, we investigate the use of
fuzzy inference techniques. Fuzzy inference is a technique that employs the use of a concept called fuzzy logic
(Zadeh, 1965). This is an artificial intelligence technique used to assist the computer to interpret vague or
uncertain terms. As humans, we often use vague terms to describe things that we observe in the world around us,
e.g. “the weather is hot”, “that man is tall”, “the danger risk is high”. Computers normally cannot understand
vague terms and must compute observations using crisp numbers, e.g. “the weather is 37.5ºC”, “that man is 182
cm tall”, “the danger risk is 89%”. Fuzzy logic helps computers to interpret vague or uncertain terms in a similar
manner to the way humans do, through the use of fuzzy sets (Zadeh, 1965). Figure 4 provides an example of one
of the fuzzy sets used by the anomaly detection module.

Figure 4: Example of a fuzzy set used by our anomaly detection module.
Fuzzy inference builds upon the use of fuzzy logic and fuzzy sets (Mamdani and Assilian, 1975, Negnevitsky,
2004), using fuzzy heuristic rules that encode knowledge using vague or uncertain terms. For example: “IF
temperature is hot, THEN air conditioner output is high”, “IF temperature is warm, THEN air conditioner output
is medium”. Fuzzy inference systems operate by processing input data that is crisp (e.g. 37.5ºC), interpreting that
value by “fuzzifying” it (e.g. 37.5ºC is a member of the term “hot”), applying the fuzzy rules to determine the
output (e.g. air conditioner output is high), then “defuzzifying” the output to produce a crisp number (e.g. air
condition output level = 90%). One of the advantages of fuzzy inference is that it is able to process data that
contains uncertain information and also has the ability to process input from several measurement sensors in
parallel. Fuzzy inference is often used in decision support systems (Turban and Aronson, 2001) to provide advice
on things that contain a level of uncertainty or risk, such as, for example, real estate evaluation (Bagnoli and
Smith, 1998). Figure 5 shows an example of one of the fuzzy inference systems used by our anomaly detection
module, which were designed using the MATLAB fuzzy toolbox (Mathworks, 2006).

Figure 5: Example of a fuzzy inference system used by our anomaly detection module.
For the anomaly detection module, we use a hierarchy of several fuzzy inference systems, shown in Figure 6, to
combine the input measurements from the nine communication behaviour metrics, and output a recommendation
for the overall deviation in communication behaviour for each communication link (i.e. between the suspect and
an associate). The final output recommendation given by the fuzzy inference hierarchy produces a number in the
range of 0.0 to 1.0, where numbers close to 0.0 signify very little change in overall communication behaviour
and numbers close to 1.0 signify a very large change in overall communication behaviour. The output fuzzy sets
in Figure 7 shows how the output recommendation is interpreted by the fuzzy inference system before producing
a crisp output value. The case study in the next section demonstrates the use of the fuzzy inference hierarchy for
summarising the amount of communication behaviour change for a suspected individual’s communication links
and compares it to the use of the outputs produced using a standard threshold anomaly detection approach (Bace
and Mell, 2001).

Figure 6: The fuzzy inference hierarchy used for the anomaly detection module, where each block is a fuzzy
inference system.

Figure 7: The output fuzzy sets used to provide the final output recommendation on the status of a suspect’s
communication behaviour.

CASE STUDY – THE ENRON E-MAIL CORPUS
The email data used for the case study is the Enron email corpus. When the company Enron was investigated
for fraudulent accounting practices in the United States in 2002, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) publicly released a corpus of emails belonging to some of the Enron employees (Diesner et al., 2005).
There are currently several versions of the Enron email corpus data that are based on the original email corpus,
which are available for researchers to use. A raw form of the email data is provided by Cohen (2004) and other
versions of the data based on Cohen’s version are provided by (Fiore and Heer, 2005, Shetty and Adibi, 2005). A

summary of how the Enron email data was processed by several researchers is described by Diesner et al.
(2005).
The version of the Enron email dataset used for this case study is the “ISI” Enron email dataset made available
by Shetty and Adibi (2005). The ISI Enron email dataset contains the email data from the mailboxes of 151
Enron employees, and contains 252,759 email messages. This particular dataset was chosen because it is already
formatted for MySQL databases, has documentation on how the data was cleaned, and the structure of the
database is suitable for our research work. The ISI Enron email dataset set was filtered into our email traffic
database by extracting only the sender, recipient, and date/time information, and ignoring other information not
used in our work, such as the content of email messages. The data was also filtered so that messages sent to
multiple recipients were considered as separate messages sent to multiple recipients at the same time. The reason
for this filtering choice is to enable the communication links to be analysed individually by the email traffic
analyser system. After filtering the Enron email traffic data into the email traffic database, the data was further
processed to store database information about the sending delays between each email sent and the replying
delays for response times to received messages. A simple statistical analysis of the Enron email data showed that
there were 75,547 unique email addresses in the email data, 2,042,442 messages were sent (after considering
multiple recipients as separate emails), and most of the email messages sent (2,063,748 or 99.966% of
messages) were between 1999 to the end of 2002.
Selecting A Suspect To Analyse
There were a number of key people associated with the Enron financial crisis in 2001 who were considered for
analysis. A list of people associated with setting up the fraudulent financial records were given by Fusaro and
Miller (2002), some of whom were also part of senior management in Enron. Out of the list of people
considered, only a few of them had their full email traffic information collected as part of the sample taken from
the 151 former Enron employees. Based on these considerations, the person selected for this case study was
Jeffrey Skilling.
Skilling first joined Enron in 1990 as the chief executive to be in charge of developing Enron’s trading services,
became CEO of Enron in February 2001, then unexpectedly resigned as CEO on 14 th August 2001 for “personal
reasons”. The reason for selecting Jeffrey Skilling is that he was a key person involved in transforming Enron
from a traditional gasline operator to a “neweconomy” trading company in the 1990’s (Fusaro and Miller,
2002). He also had a short 6month run as CEO of Enron before resigning in August 2001, and most of his
mailbox information is available as part of the Enron email dataset.
Before analysing Jeffrey Skilling’s email traffic, it had to be determined which out of the 75,547 unique email
addresses belonged to Jeffrey Skilling. To find Jeffrey Skilling’s email addresses, a wildcard database search
was performed for possible email addresses matching “j%skilli%” and “skilli%”, where “%” is the wildcard
character for the search. The results of this search returned 15 possible matching email addresses, shown in
Table 1.
Table 1: A listing of email addresses possibly belonging to Jeffrey Skilling.
Possible Matching Email Addresses for Jeffrey Skilling
'jeff.skilling@enron.com', 'jeffrey.k.skilling@enron.com', 'jeffrey.skilling@enron.com',
'jeffreyskilling@yahoo.com', 'jeffrey_skilling@enron.com', 'jeff_skilling@enron.com',
'jskilli.enron@enron.com', 'jskilli@ei.enron.com', 'jskilli@enron.com', 'jskilling@enron.com',
'skilli@ei.enron.com', 'skilli@enron.com', 'skilling@enron.com', 'skilling@tribune.com',
'skillingj@enron.com'
Profiling the Suspect’s Normal Behaviour Patterns
The Enron email dataset mainly covers a timespan from 1999 to end of 2002 with the exception of outlier
messages dated at years such as 0001 and 2044, which were excluded from the analysis. During the 1999 – 2002

timespan, there were a number of key events that occurred, ending with the company’s declaration of
bankruptcy in December 2001 (Fusaro and Miller, 2002, Fox, 2003). Based on the knowledge of when these key
events occurred, the normal behaviour profiling period was selected from 1st January 1999 to 1st August 2000.
This period of time was selected because it was before Enron faced its 2001 financial crisis, the period ends at
about 6 months before Jeffrey Skilling becomes CEO of Enron in February 2001, and it was before a change in
organisational structure resulting from Jeffrey Skilling becoming CEO. Figure 8 shows a diagram of Jeffrey
Skilling’s email addresses and the people communicating with those addresses during the profiling period,
visualised using GUESS (Adar, 2006).
Detection of Abnormal Changes in Behaviour
To detect abnormal changes in Jeffrey Skilling’s communication behaviour, the surveillance period selected for
analysis was 1st February 2001 to 1st September 2001, which was the period of time when Jeffrey Skilling became
CEO of Enron in Feburary 2001 and also resigned as CEO in August 2001. A diagram of Jeffrey Skilling’s e
mail addresses and his associates during the surveillance period is shown in Figure 9. The anomaly detection
module detected, using standard threshold anomaly detection techniques, a series of alerts for some of the nine
communication behaviour metrics and also detected the appearance of new associate email addresses, shown in
Table 2. This table shows what alerts were generated when the changes in behaviour were analysed separately for
each of the communication behaviour metrics.
Using the same surveillance period, the fuzzy inference anomaly detection technique was used to analyse Jeffrey
Skilling’s email traffic data and the alerts generated from this are shown in Table 3. The results in Table 3
shows how the alerts are presented to the user when the measurements from all of the communication behaviour
metrics are combined, to produce an abnormality rating for each of the suspects’ communication links. Each of
the results is sorted in descending order according to the abnormality rating.
The alert results shown in Table 3, show that when the interaction between jeff.skilling@enron.com and
rosalee.fleming@enron.com was investigated, they had an abnormality rating of 0.092071181977. This uncovered
not much change in behaviour during the surveillance period. The time series visualisation provided by
TimeSearcher 2 (Aris et al., 2005) in Figure 10, confirms that there was not much deviation in communication
between Jeffrey Skilling and Rosalee Fleming, despite the spike in email traffic that was outside of the profiling
and surveillance period. An analysis of the interaction between jeff.skilling@enron.com and
steven.kean@enron.com, which had an abnormality rating of 0.5, uncovered a reasonable change in
communication behaviour during the surveillance period. Figure 11 shows increase in email traffic activity from
Steven Kean to Jeffrey Skilling, suggesting there might have been a change in relationship during the
surveillance period. According to the organisational role spreadsheet provided by Shetty and Adibi (2005),
Steven Kean was actually the Vice President and Chief of Staff at Enron, which might have explained why he
had more communication with Jeffrey Skilling after he became CEO in February 2001.

Figure 8: Jeffrey Skilling’s circle of associates from 1st January 1999 to 1st August 2000 (17 months), with his e
mail addresses highlighted in orange.

Figure 9: Jeffrey Skilling’s circle of associates from 1st February 2001 to 1st September 2001 (7 months).
Table 2: Listing of alerts generated using the standard threshold anomaly detection technique for the anomaly
detection module (note: individual communication link details aren’t shown in the table).
Email Account
'jeff.skilling@enron.com'

'jeffrey.k.skilling@enron.com'

Types of Alert  Number of Alerts Generated
AppearanceNewContacts – 763; CombinedSpeedOfReplies – 5;
SendingDelaysFromContacts – 17; SendingDelaysToContacts – 502;
SpeedOfRepliesFromContacts – 3; SpeedOfRepliesToContacts – 4;
WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 2; WeeklyConsistEmailsSent – 8;
WeeklyPercentEmailsReceived – 3;
NO ALERTS

'jeffrey.skilling@enron.com'

AppearanceNewContacts – 2; SendingDelaysFromContacts – 1;
WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 4;

'jeffreyskilling@yahoo.com’

NO ALERTS

'jeffrey_skilling@enron.com'

AppearanceNewContacts – 1; WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 1;

'jeff_skilling@enron.com'

AppearanceNewContacts – 6; WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 8;

'jskilli.enron@enron.com’

AppearanceNewContacts – 1; WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 1;

'jskilli@ei.enron.com'
'jskilli@enron.com'

AppearanceNewContacts – 4; SendingDelaysFromContacts – 1;
WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 3;
AppearanceNewContacts – 21; SendingDelaysFromContacts – 1;
WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 1; WeeklyPercentEmailsReceived  1

'jskilling@enron.com'

AppearanceNewContacts – 1; WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 1;

'skilli@ei.enron.com'

AppearanceNewContacts – 1; WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 1;

'skilli@enron.com'

AppearanceNewContacts – 3; SendingDelaysFromContacts – 1;
WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 3;

'skilling@enron.com'

AppearanceNewContacts – 3; WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 2;
WeeklyConsistEmailsSent – 1;

'skilling@tribune.com'

AppearanceNewContacts – 1; SendingDelaysFromContacts – 1;
WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 1;

'skillingj@enron.com'

AppearanceNewContacts – 1; WeeklyConsistEmailsReceived – 1;

Table 3: Listing of rated alerts generated using fuzzy inference for the anomaly detection module.
Email Account

Associate Email Address

Abnormality Rating

jeff.skilling@enron.com

steven.kean@enron.com

0.5

jskilli@enron.com

markskilling@hotmail.com

0.5

jeff.skilling@enron.com

karen.denne@enron.com

0.3

jeff.skilling@enron.com

kelly.johnson@enron.com

0.3

jeff.skilling@enron.com

liz.taylor@enron.com

0.3

jeff.skilling@enron.com

markskilling@hotmail.com

0.3

jeff.skilling@enron.com

wilson.kriegel@enron.com

0.3

jeff.skilling@enron.com

chris.abel@enron.com

0.113355289747

jeff.skilling@enron.com

rosalee.fleming@enron.com

0.092071181977

jeff.skilling@enron.com

aahanch@enron.com

0.091424688331

jeff.skilling@enron.com

aalkhay@enron.com

0.091424688331

[514 more email addresses...]

[514 more email addresses...]

[514 more abnormality ratings of
0.091424688331 or less...]

Figure 10: The weekly time series email traffic of Jeffrey Skilling and Rosalee Fleming, focusing on the
surveillance period from 1st February 2001 (week 108) to 1st September 2001 (week 138).

Figure 11: The weekly time series email traffic of Jeffrey Skilling and Steven Kean, focusing on the surveillance
period from 1st February 2001 (week 108) to 1st September 2001 (week 138).

DISCUSSION
The case study shows that fusing together different communication behaviour measurements with fuzzy
inference and presenting the results as abnormality rankings, helps to summarise the degree of overall changes in
communication behaviour for suspect email accounts. In addition, the fuzzy inference results also helped to
prioritise which email communication links were exhibiting the most abnormal changes in behaviour. The use
of visualisation in Figures 10 and 11 helped to verify these abnormal changes in communication behaviour. The
case study showed that fuzzy inference makes it easier to interpret the email traffic anomaly detection results, in
comparison to presenting individual types of anomaly detection results separately.
Although fuzzy inference helps to summarise the email traffic anomaly detection results, one of the drawbacks
with using fuzzy inference is that a fuzzy inference system is complex to design, and it takes a great deal of
effort to build and finetune its performance. It is often said that: “improving the system becomes rather an art
than engineering” (Negnevitsky, 2004), meaning that it often takes some trial & error and experience to
determine if the system is performing the way it is expected. Another drawback with our use of fuzzy inference
was that the design of the fuzzy rules and fuzzy sets were manually constructed, based on one of the author’s
current empirical knowledge of email traffic. However, there are ways of automating some of the design process
when developing fuzzy inference systems. An example of this is where (Dickerson et al., 2001) used a fuzzy C
means algorithm (Bezdek, 1981) to automate the part of the process of designing the fuzzy sets for their network
intrusion detection system.
Since this work is research in progress, one of the things to note for further work is that the fuzzy inference
hierarchy shown in Figure 6 illustrates only one of the possible groupings for combining the inputs for fuzzy
inference. This may not necessarily be the best possible grouping, so other input combinations will need to be
tested to see if they affect the results given by the fuzzy inference hierarchy. Other issues that will need to be
considered in our further work is the duration of time required to profile and observe the suspect’s change in
behaviour, and whether or not the suspect’s behaviour should be updated periodically since it may change
gradually over time?

CONCLUSION
We have shown how using fuzzy inference techniques may make the email traffic anomaly detection results
easier for the user/analyst to interpret, through ranking the degree of abnormality for different communication
links between the suspect and their associates. Most approaches shown by other researchers, focus on presenting
the user a whole selection of information on different communication behaviour measures, but do not provide a
ranking for the user/analyst to decide which email addresses or communication links receives higher priority in
the investigation of anomalous behaviour. The advantage of fusing together information from different
communication behaviour measures to perform email traffic anomaly detection, and investigating a person’s
traffic communication behaviour from the Enron email corpus was also shown. Future work will involve
comparing the results from the analysis of our simulated email data and real email data, investigating the use of
different input grouping combinations for the fuzzy inference hierarchy, and investigating different time
durations for the profiling and surveillance of the email user’s traffic behaviour.
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